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ABSTRACT 
 
Security is considered to be an aspect of information systems.  Role-based access control 
(RBAC) is an approach to restricting system access to authorized users in information 
systems. Existing security modeling languages and/or approaches address the security of 
the IS, however existing languages or approaches do not necessarily conforms to the needs 
of RBAC. There are several modeling languages (e.g. SecureUML, UMLSec, etc.) to 
represent RBAC but they are not interoperable and it is not easy to compare one with 
another. Each modeling language represents different perspectives on information systems. 
Besides, there is a need to merge design and requirement stages in order to discover system 
security concerns and analyze related security trade-offs at the earlier stages. Knowledge 
acquisition in automated specification (KAOS) is a goal oriented requirement engineering 
approach to elicit software requirements. In this point, KAOS will be a key solution in 
order to combine requirements with design principles. 
 
In this thesis, we will analyze KAOS to apply RBAC. More specifically, we will apply a 
systematic approach to understand how KAOS can be used to apply RBAC. Our research 
work will be based on the transformation rules between KAOS-SecureUML and KAOS-
UMLSec, and vice versa. Moreover, through these transformations we will show how we 
aligned KAOS to RBAC. 
 
The contribution of this research has several benefits. Firstly, it will potentially help to 
understand how KAOS could deal with RBAC. Secondly it will define the approach to 
elicit security requirements for RBAC at early stages of the IS development. This will 
apply our results in a case study to measure the correctness of the defined approach. 
Thirdly, the transformations from/to the KAOS would help IS developers and the other 
system stakeholders (e.g. system analysts, system administrators, etc.) to understand how 
important these security approaches (KAOS, SecureUML and UMLSec) are and which one 
has more advantages/disadvantages. We plan to validate our results for transformation 
rules and the models regarding their correctness that will be measured. Last but not least, 
we will be able to justify the design stage with requirement stage. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Nowadays information systems are everywhere in our lives, such as banking, education, 
health, and legacy, etc., therefore information system security plays an important role in 
information systems, which in many cases, information is confidential and should not be 
accessible to everyone.  
 
In computer systems security, role-based access control (RBAC) [11] is an approach to 
restricting system access to authorized users. RBAC is a very popular security pattern in 
information systems. It is basically used for ensuring confidentiality. Knowledge 
acquisition in automated specification (KAOS) [13] is a goal-oriented software 
requirements capturing approach in requirements engineering. 
 
Even though security is an important aspect in information systems, security issues and 
concerns are raised only when the system is already in use, or is about to start running, or 
luckily in the best case, security is just considered during the late system development 
phases for instance implementation phase. This is an obstacle to secure the system 
development. System security concerns should be discovered and related security trade-
offs should be analyzed at the earlier stages such as requirements or design stages. There is 
possible way to guide such an analysis is suggested by the model-driven approaches. For 
example, “SecureUML [7] and UMLSec [7] which are both originated from UML and also 
deal with security modeling, these modeling approaches could be applied to model RBAC 
in a system [9], they are rather specific than general. They actually both contain targeted 
concepts for RBAC” but they fail to satisfy our needs about the security analysis in the 
earlier stages. Our motivation to look at KAOS was also strengthened by the fact that it is 
not used to analyze the access control before. However, it contains basic RBAC concepts. 
In addition to this, we can justify the design with the requirements; this means we can 
secure the system development at early stages. In order to continue our research, we 
formulate the following research question: 
 
 Can KAOS be aligned to model RBAC or not? If yes, how? 
 
In order to answer this research question we have analyzed the KAOS literature [12] and 
tested it on Meeting Scheduler Example [16] and Food Delivery Example. At the same 
time, we also benefit from the SecureUML and UMLSec literature work [7] and 
application of these approaches on Meeting Scheduler Example. We had chance to 
compare each modeling approaches. Our observations are that KAOS can be applied to 
model RBAC. According to the common concepts and the similarities between KAOS and 
RBAC, we can use KAOS to define RBAC.  
  
The structure of the thesis is as follows: after giving brief introduction in Chapter 1. As 
Background part, in Chapter 2 we introduce the general RBAC model. In Chapter 3 we 
introduce one modeling approach - KAOS model. Later on, in Chapter 4 we present related 
work that has been done with RBAC on two modeling approaches – SecureUML and 
UMLSec. As Contribution part, in Chapter 5 we understand the KAOS language with its 
similarities with RBAC. Then, in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 we define transformation rules 
between KAOS-SecureUML and KAOS-UMLSec and vice versa. As Validation part, in 
Chapter 8 we select one of the validation options and design our test for validity. In 
Chapter 9 we situate our contribution in a case study and discuss our results. Finally as 
Conclusion part, in Chapter 10 we finalize our work and present some future work. 
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PART I BACKGROUND 
 
 
 
 
PART I 
 
BACKGROUND  
16 
 
In Background Part, we are going to present literature work and reviews of RBAC, KAOS, 
and related works. 
 
Mainly on RBAC side, we focus on RBAC reference models, and other access control 
models. On KAOS side, we discuss about abstract syntax, concrete syntax and semantics 
of KAOS, KAOS models and relationship between security and KAOS. After that, we 
finalize with related works that has been done with RBAC on different security modeling 
languages.
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Chapter 2. Role-based Access Control 
 
“In computer systems security, role-based access control (RBAC) is an approach to 
restricting system access to authorized users. Within an organization, roles are created for 
various job functions. The permissions to perform certain operations are assigned to 
specific roles. Members of staff (or other system users) are assigned particular roles, and 
through those role assignments acquire the computer permissions to perform particular 
computer-system functions. Since users are not assigned permissions directly, but only 
acquire them through their role(s), management of individual user rights becomes a matter 
of simply assigning appropriate roles to the user's account; this simplifies common 
operations, such as adding a user, or changing a user's department.” [1] and [17]. In Fig. 1 
we see the basic elements of RBAC model. 
 
 
Figure 1 RBAC 
(adapted from [1]) 
 
2.1. Terms and Concepts 
The Table 1 shows the terms and concepts of RBAC [11]. This table covers all the terms 
and concepts of RBAC but actually we are not going to use and benefit from all of them. 
Users, Roles, Operations, Objects and Permissions are the main elements of RBAC. 
 
2.2. RBAC Reference Models 
In this section, we are going to present RBAC reference models. The figure 2 shows the 
family of RBAC models. 
 
Figure 2 A Family of RBAC Models 
(adapted from [11]) 
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Table 1 RBAC Terms and Concepts 
(adapted from [11]) 
 
Access A specific type of interaction between a subject and an object that 
results in the flow of information from one to the other. 
Access control The process of limiting access to the resources of a system only to 
authorized programs, processes, or other systems. 
Administrative 
role 
A role that includes permission to modify the set of users, roles, or 
permissions, or to modify the user assignment or permission 
assignment relations. 
Constraint A relationship between or among roles. 
Group A set of users. 
Object A passive entity that contains or receives information. 
Permissions A description of the type of authorized interactions a subject can have 
with an object. 
Resource Anything used or consumed while performing a function. The 
categories of resources are time, information, objects, or processors. 
Role A job function within the organization that describes the authority and 
responsibility conferred on a user assigned to the role. 
Role hierarchy A partial order relationship established among roles. 
Session A mapping between a user and an activated subset of the set of roles 
the user is assigned to. 
Subject An active entity, generally in the form of a person, process, or device 
that causes information to flow among objects or changes the system 
state. 
System 
administrator 
The individual who establishes the system security policies, performs 
the administrative roles, and reviews the system audit trail. 
User Any person who interacts directly with a computer system. 
2.2.1. RBAC0 
RBAC0 is also called base model or core model. It has four entities: users, roles, 
permissions and sessions. 
 
Users and roles: User is a human and role is a job function within the organization which 
describes the authority and responsibility of a member. 
Permissions: Permission is an ability to access to one or multiple objects in the system. As 
a term, authorization, access right or privilege are also used instead of permission in the 
literature. 
Sessions: Session is a mapping between the user and a subset of the roles belong to that 
user. 
 
RBAC0 model has the following components: 
 “U, R, P, and S respectively represent users, roles, permissions, and sessions; 
 PA  P X R, a many-to-many permission-to-role assignment relation; 
 UA  U X R, a many-to-many user-to-role assignment relation; 
 user: S  U, a function mapping each session si to the single user user(si) (constant for 
the session’s lifetime); and 
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 roles: S  2R, a function mapping each session si to a set of roles roles(si)  {r | 
(user(si), r)  UA} (which can change with time) and session si has the permissions r 
 roles(si) {p | (p, r)  PA}” [11]. 
2.2.2. RBAC1 
RBAC1 is also called hierarchical RBAC. It introduces role hierarchies. 
 
RBAC1 model has the following components: 
 “U, R, P, S, PA, UA, and user are unchanged from RBAC0; 
 RH  R X R is a partial order on R called the role hierarchy or role dominance 
relation, also written as ≥; and  
 roles: S  2R is modified from RBAC0 to require  
roles(si)  {r | ( r’≥ r) [(users(si), r’)  UA ]} (which can change with time] and 
session si has the permissions  
r  roles(si) {p | r”≤ r) [(p, r”)  PA]}” [11]. 
2.2.3. RBAC2 
RBAC2 is also called constrained RBAC. It introduces constraints. 
 
“RBAC2 is unchanged from RBAC0 except for requiring that there be constraints to 
determine the acceptability of various components of RBAC0. Only acceptable values will 
be permitted” [11]. 
2.2.4. RBAC3 
RBAC3 is also called consolidated model. It provides both role hierarchies and constraints, 
as it combines RBAC1 and RBAC2. 
2.3. Other Access Control Models 
There are four most widely recognized models. First one is RBAC which we already gave 
its description and characteristics. The others are Discretionary Access Control (DAC), 
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC).  
Access control models are sometimes categorized as either discretionary or non-
discretionary. For example, MAC and RBAC are non-discretionary. “Role-based access 
control (RBAC) is an access policy determined by the system, not the owner. RBAC is 
used in commercial applications and also in military systems, where multi-level security 
requirements may also exist. RBAC differs from DAC in that DAC allows users to control 
access to their resources, while in RBAC, access is controlled at the system level, outside 
of the user's control. Although RBAC is non-discretionary, it can be distinguished from 
MAC primarily in the way permissions are handled. MAC controls read and write 
permissions based on a user's clearance level and additional labels. RBAC controls 
collections of permissions that may include complex operations such as an e-commerce 
transaction, or may be as simple as read or write. A role in RBAC can be viewed as a set of 
permissions.” [17]. 
2.3.1. Discretionary Access Control 
“Discretionary access control (DAC) is a policy determined by the owner of an object. The 
owner decides who is allowed to access the object and what privileges they have. 
 
Two important concepts in DAC are: 
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- File and data ownership: Every object in the system has an owner. In most DAC 
systems, each object's initial owner is the subject that caused it to be created. The 
access policy for an object is determined by its owner. 
- Access rights and permissions: These are the controls that an owner can assign to 
other subjects for specific resources.” [17]. 
2.3.2. Mandatory Access Control 
“Mandatory access control refers to allowing access to a resource if and only if rules exist 
that allows a given user to access the resource. It is difficult to manage but its use is 
usually justified when used to protect highly sensitive information. Examples include 
certain government and military information. Management is often simplified (over what 
can be required) if the information can be protected using hierarchical access control, or by 
implementing sensitivity labels. What makes the method "mandatory" is the use of either 
rules or sensitivity labels. 
- Sensitivity labels: In such a system subjects and objects must have labels assigned 
to them. A subject's sensitivity label specifies its level of trust. An object's 
sensitivity label specifies the level of trust required for access. In order to access a 
given object, the subject must have a sensitivity level equal to or higher than the 
requested object. 
- Data import and export: Controlling the import of information from other systems 
and export to other systems (including printers) is a critical function of these 
systems, which must ensure that sensitivity labels are properly maintained and 
implemented so that sensitive information is appropriately protected at all times. 
 
Two methods are commonly used for applying mandatory access control: 
- Rule-based (or label-based) access control. 
- Lattice-based access control.” [17]. 
2.3.3. Attribute-based access control 
“In attribute-based access control (ABAC), access is granted not based on the rights of the 
subject associated with a user after authentication, but based on attributes of the user. The 
user has to prove so called claims about his attributes to the access control engine. An 
attribute-based access control policy specifies which claims need to be satisfied in order to 
grant access to an object. For instance the claim could be "older than 18”. Any user that 
can prove this claim is granted access. Users can be anonymous as authentication and 
identification are not strictly required. One does however require means for proving claims 
anonymously. This can for instance be achieved using anonymous credentials or XACML 
(extensible access control markup language).” [17].  
2.4. Summary 
Even though RBAC is well known security pattern, still there is some disagreements on 
what RBAC means. That’s why RBAC is open to interpretation by researchers, system 
developers and especially security pattern and application designers. 
 
“Sophisticated variations of RBAC include the capability to establish relations between 
roles, between permissions and roles, and between users and roles. These role-role 
relations can enforce security policies, including separation of duties and delegation of 
authority. Previously, these relations would have required application software encoding; 
with RBAC, they can be specified once for a security domain” [11]. 
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In RBAC, these relations can be predefined; assigning users to the roles is making it 
simple. Besides “without RBAC, it can also be difficult to determine what permissions 
have been authorized for what users” [11]. 
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Chapter 3. Knowledge Acquisition in Automated 
Specification 
 
“KAOS is a methodology for requirements engineering enabling analysts to build 
requirements models and to derive requirements documents from KAOS models” [10]. 
 
KAOS is a goal-oriented software requirements capturing approach in requirements 
engineering. It is a specific goal modeling method. It allows requirements for being 
calculated from goal diagrams. 
 
 
Figure 3 KAOS 
(adapted from [9]) 
3.1. Abstract Syntax 
The KAOS approach consists of a modeling language, a method, and a software 
environment. In this section, we will consider KAOS modeling language’s abstract syntax. 
In other words, we present the grammar rules of KAOS. 
 
A KAOS model includes a goal model, a responsibility model, an object model and an 
operation model. Each of them has a graphical and a textual syntax. We will introduce 
KAOS through examples from the London Ambulance Service system, and Figure 4 [4]. 
 
“A goal is a prescriptive assertion that captures an objective which the system-to-be should 
meet. Goals are either maintain, avoid, achieve and cease goals. For example, goal 
AccurateLocationInfoOnNonStationaryAmbulance follows the maintain pattern in which a 
property always holds. AmbulanceAllocationBasedOnIncidentForm follows the achieve 
pattern where a property eventually holds. A goal is refined through G-refinement, which 
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relates a set of subgoals whose conjunction, possibly together with domain properties, 
contributes to the satisfaction of the goal. A goal can have alternative G-refinements (e.g. 
AccurateStationaryInfo). A set of goals is conflicting if these goals cannot be achieved 
together (e.g. LocationContactedByPhone and InformationSentByEMail). This means that 
under some boundary condition these goals become logically inconsistent in a considered 
domain” [6]. 
 
“An object (e.g. Ambulance in the object model in Figure 4) is a thing of interest in the 
system. Its instances can be distinctly identified and may evolve from state to state. Objects 
have attributes. Goals concern objects and attributes (see Def in textual goal syntax in 
Figure 4). An agent plays a role towards a goal’s satisfaction by monitoring or controlling 
object behavior. Goals are refined until they are assigned to individual agents. A goal 
effectively assigned to a software agent (e.g. CAD - Computer Aided Dispatch) is called a 
requirement. A goal effectively assigned to an environment agent (e.g. Ambulance Staff) is 
called an expectation (assumption in [4]). An operation is an input-output relation over 
objects. Operations are characterized textually by domain and required conditions. 
Whenever the required conditions hold, performing the operations satisfies the goal. If a 
goal is operationalised and has a responsible agent, the latter performs the operations (see 
operation model in Figure 4)” [6]. 
 
3.2. KAOS Models 
3.2.1. Goal Model 
“The KAOS Goal Model is the set of interrelated goal diagrams that have been put 
together for tackling a particular problem” [10]. A KAOS goal model is a directed graph 
(which is more general than a simple tree), which means that a given goal can appear on 
different diagrams to refine different higher-level goals. Figure 5 shows metamodel of the 
KAOS goal model, [4] and [15]. 
3.2.2. Responsibility Model 
“The KAOS responsibility model is the set of derived responsibility diagrams” [10]. The 
responsibility model contains all the responsibility diagrams. A responsibility diagram 
describes for each agent, the requirements and expectations that he’s responsible for, or 
that have been assigned to him. To build a responsibility diagram, the analyst reviews the 
different requirements and expectations in the goal model and assigns an agent to each of 
them. 
3.2.3. Object Model 
“The KAOS object model contains objects, agents, entities and relationships among them. 
The notation used in the object model complies with the one used in UML for class 
diagrams” [10]. 
 
The object model is used to define and document the concepts of the application domain 
that are relevant with respect to the known requirements and to provide static constraints 
on the operational system that will satisfy the requirements. 
 
Three types of objects may coexist in the object model: 
 Entities: they represent independent, passive objects. ‘Independent’ means that their 
descriptions needn’t refer to other objects of the model. They may have attributes 
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whose values define a set of states the entity can transition to. They are ‘passive’ means 
they can’t perform operations.  
 Agents: they represent independent, active objects. They are active meaning they can 
perform operations. Operations usually imply state transitions on entities.  
 Associations: they are dependent, passive objects. ‘Dependent’ because their 
descriptions refer to other objects. They can have attributes whose values define the set 
of states the entity can transition to. They are passive so they can’t perform operations. 
But agents can make association instances change state by performing operations.  
 
The KAOS object model is compliant with UML class diagrams in that KAOS entities 
correspond to UML classes; and KAOS associations correspond to UML binary 
association links or n-ary association classes. Inheritance is available to all types of objects 
(including associations). Objects can be qualified with attributes. 
 
 
Figure 4 KAOS Model Fragment for the London Ambulance Service System 
(directly taken from [4]) 
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Cease goal Avoid goal
Achieve goal Maintain goal
-name : string
-def : string
-priority : string
-owner : string
-category : string
-formalSpec : string
GoalSoftgoal
Conflict
0..*
-betweenGoals
*
-name : string
-def : string
-formalSpec : string
-likelihood : string
-critically : string
Boundary condition
1
1 -complete : bool
-attName : string
-tactics : string
G-refinement
-superGoal1
0..* -subGoal 0..*
1..*
-name : string
-def : string
-formalSpec : string
Domain property
-subProperty0..*
0..*
-isInDomain
0..*
0..*
Domain invariant Domain hypothesis
-attName : string
Assignment
Requirement
Expectation
Software agent
Environment agent
1
-assignedGoal
0..*
1..*
-isResponsibleFor
1
0..*
-isResponsibleFor
1
-complete : bool
-attName : string
Operationalization
1
-op_goal
0..*
Op operation
1
-belongsTo1..*
ReqTrig
RegPre
PrePost DomPre
DomPost
-name : string
-def : string
-j modifier : bool
Operation
1..*
-op_op_operation
1
1-hasTrig1
1
-hasPre1
1 -hasPost1
-def : string
-name : string
Condition
1
-hasPre1
1
-hasPost1
-name : string
-def : string
Agent
1..*
-responsibleAgent
1
Object_OR_Attribute
-controls0..*
0..1
0..*
-monitors0..*
Attribute
-name : string
-def : string
Object
Association
EntityEvent
1
-performs
1..*
-causes0..*
0..*
-occurs0In0..*
0..*
0..*
-concerns
0..* 0..*
-isInputFor
0..*
-isOutputFor
0..*
..
0..*
1
-belongsTo
11..*
 
Figure 5 A Metamodel of the KAOS Goal Model 
(adapted from [15]) 
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3.2.4. Operation Model 
“The KAOS operation model sums up all the behaviors that agents need to have to fulfill 
their requirements. Behaviors are expressed in terms of operations performed by agents. 
Those operations work on objects described in the object model: they can create objects, 
provoke object state transitions or trigger other operations through sent and received 
events” [10]. 
 
The KAOS operation model describes all the behaviors that agents need to fulfill their 
requirements. Behaviors are expressed in terms of operations performed by agents. 
Operations work on objects, they can create objects, trigger object state transitions and 
activate other operations. 
 
A KAOS operation diagram typically composes operations performed by one or several 
agents to achieve a requirement. Compositions are made through data flows (the output of 
an operation output becomes the input of another operation) or control flow (an event sent 
by an operation triggers or stops another operation). An operation diagram thus describes 
how the agents need to cooperate in order to make the system work. With KAOS, the 
operation model is connected to the goal model: the analysts justify operations by the goals 
they “operationalize”. An operation with no justification means that either there is still 
missing goals in the model or that the operation is not necessary. Conversely if some 
requirements are left without “operationalization”, they may just be wishful thinking. 
3.3. Concrete Syntax 
Besides abstract syntax, KAOS also has concrete syntax like spoken languages do. In 
spoken languages, there are letters and words but in KAOS, there are constructs. 
 
“Agent: Active Object (=processor) performing operations to achieve goals. Agents can be 
the software being considered as a whole or parts of it. Agents can also come from the 
environment of the software being studied; human agents are in the environment.  
Association: Object, the definition of which relies on other objects linked by the 
association.  
Composite system: The software being studied and its environment. 
Conflict: Goals are conflicting if under some boundary condition the goals cannot be 
achieved altogether.  
Domain Property: Descriptive assertion about objects in the environment of the software. 
It may be a domain invariant or a hypothesis. A domain invariant is a property known to 
hold in every state of some domain object, e.g., a physical law, regulation, … A hypothesis 
is a property about some domain object supposed to hold.  
Entity: Autonomous object, that is, the definition of which does not rely on other objects.  
Environment: Part of the universe capable of interaction with the software being studied.  
Event: Instantaneous object (that is, an object alive in one state only) which triggers 
operations performed by agents.  
Expectation: Goal assigned to an agent in the environment.  
Formal model: Model in which the concepts have been mathematically formalized. 
Goal: Prescriptive assertion capturing some objective to be met by cooperation of agents; it 
prescribes a set of desired behaviors. Requirements and expectations are goals.  
Model: Abstract representation of a composite system. An model represents a composite 
system by means of concepts of different types, mainly, objects, desired or undesired 
properties (goals, obstacles), and behaviors (operations).  
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Object: Thing of interest in the composite system being modeled whose instances can be 
distinctly identified and may evolve from state to state. Agents, events, entities and 
associations are objects.  
Obstacle: Condition (other than a goal) whose satisfaction may prevent some goal(s) from 
being achieved; it defines a set of undesired behaviors.  
Operation: Specifies state transitions of objects that are input and/or output of the 
operation. Operations are performed by agents.  
Operationalisation: Relationship linking a requirement to operations. Holds when each 
execution of the operations (possibly constrained to that intent) will entail the requirement. 
Makes the connection between expected properties (goals) and behaviors (operations).  
Refinement: Relationship linking a goal to other goals that are called its subgoals. Each 
subgoal contributes to the satisfaction of the goal it refines. The conjunction of all the 
subgoals must be a sufficient condition entailing the goal they refine.  
Requirement: Goal assigned to an agent of the software being studied.  
Responsibility: Relationship between an agent and a requirement. Holds when an agent is 
assigned the responsibility of achieving the linked requirement.  
Semi-formal model: Model in which the concepts are not mathematically formalized, every 
concept in the model receives a name, a type, a textual definition, values for attributes and 
a graphical representation.” [10]. 
3.4. Semantics 
“The KAOS approach provides support for security goal specification in terms of a number 
of specialized meta-classes of goal, namely, Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, 
Privacy, Authentication and Non-repudiation goal subclasses.  In order to support the 
concepts of attacker knowledge, the formal language of goals is extended with the 
epistemic operators, KnowsVag, which is defined as follows: 
 
KnowsVag (v) = Ǝx: Knowsag(x=v)  (“knows value”) 
Knowsag(P) = Beliefag (P) ˄ P    (“knows property) 
 
The operational semantics of the epistemic operator Beliefag(P) is defined as “P being one 
of the properties stored in the local memory of agent ag”.  The knowledge of a value of a 
property at a given point depends on both the agent having a value for the property in its 
local memory and that property value actually holding at the given point in time. 
 
The use of obstacles for security goals makes obstacle refinement trees analogous to the 
threat trees that are used for modeling potential attacks security-critical systems.  However, 
obstacles neither capture the goals and knowledge of a potential attacker; or the 
vulnerabilities in software systems. The notions of anti-goals and anti-models  were  
introduced  to  the  KAOS framework  in  order  to  deal  with  these  problems. Combining 
with the epistemic operators described above, allows security patterns to be expressed in 
the KAOS framework” [9]. 
3.5. KAOS Extension to Security 
KAOS is based on goals and these goals are operationalized into specifications of 
operations to achieve them. Besides that, goals refer to objects which can be derived from 
their specification to create UML class diagrams as a structural model of a system. Along 
this process, because of obstacles sometimes it is needed to generate some alternative 
resolutions such as: “goal substitution, agent substitution, goal weakening, goal restoration, 
obstacle prevention and obstacle mitigation” [13]. Obstacles are a means for identifying 
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goal violation scenarios. In declarative terms, an obstacle to some goal is a condition 
whose satisfaction may prevent the goal from being achieved. “Richer models should thus 
be built to capture attackers, their goals and capabilities, the software vulnerabilities they 
can monitor or control, and attacks that satisfy their goals based on their capabilities and on 
the system’s vulnerabilities” [13]. 
 
Anti-goals are the goals of attackers which includes malicious obstacles to security goals. 
Anti-goals should be distinguished from the goals the system under consideration should 
satisfy. Anti-model is a model that exhibits how specifications of model elements could be 
maliciously threatened, why and by whom. “Anti-models should lead to the generation of 
more subtle threats and the derivation of more robust security requirements as anticipated 
countermeasures to such threats” [13]. Table 2 shows the anti-model building method [13]. 
 
Table 2 Anti-Model Building Method 
(adapted from [13]) 
 
1. Get initial anti-goals by negating relevant Confidentiality, Privacy, Integrity 
and Availability goal specification patterns instantiated to sensitive objects 
from the object model. 
2. For each such anti-goal, elicit potential attacker agents that might own the 
anti-goal, from questions such as “WHO can benefit from this anti-goal?” 
(Applicationspecific specializations of known attacker taxonomies may help 
answering such questions). 
3. For each anti-goal and corresponding attacker class(es) identified, elicit the 
attacker’s higher-level anti-goals from questions such as “WHY would 
instances of this attacker class want to achieve this anti-goal?”. Such 
questions may be asked recursively to elicit more and more abstract anti-
goals yielding threat rationales together with other potential threats from 
alternative refinements of those higher-level anti-goals. 
4. Elaborate the anti-goal AND/OR graph by AND refining/abstracting anti-
goals along alternative branches, with the aim of deriving terminal anti-goals 
that are realizable either by the identified attacker agents or by attackee 
software agents. The former are anti-requirements assigned to the attacker 
whereas the latter are vulnerabilities assigned to the attackee. 
5. Derive the object and agent anti-models from anti-goal specifications. The 
boundary between the anti-machine (under the attacker’s control) and the 
anti-environment (which includes the software attackee) are thereby derived 
together with monitoring/control interfaces. 
6. AND/OR-operationalize all anti-requirements in terms of potential 
capabilities of the corresponding attacker agent – the latter may include blind 
or intelligent searching, eavesdropping, deciphering, spoofing, cookie 
installation, etc. 
3.6. Summary 
A lot of requirements documents produced nowadays just describe solutions: the expected 
functions, processes and data structures. However it should become clear to the reader that 
a requirements analysis with KAOS is much more than a limited description of the 
solution. An important focus is put on the problem itself. If we compare the kind of 
information provided by the solution description with the one provided by the problem 
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description, we will see that the information collected in the latter diagrams are not 
irrelevant for the requirements document. They introduce abstract and fundamental 
properties that have to be fulfilled by the system to be. If a requirements document 
consisting only of description derived from solution description, one can reasonably expect 
that a development team will develop the system right with respect to that specification. 
But how may we guarantee that the system built is the right system if we discard the first 
part of the analysis which describes precisely what the users really need? 
 
Some of the benefits of KAOS are listed below [10]: 
 
- “Traceability: A major benefit of KAOS resides in the fact that it provides continuum 
between the problem description and the expected solution description. This bi-
directional traceability between problem and solution spaces is fundamental not only 
for the requirements analyst to be sure, the system to build will be the right one, but 
also for developers who need to understand the context and objectives to make correct 
architectural and design choices. Moreover systems developed nowadays work in a 
quickly changing environment that requires lots of modifications. As with KAOS, the 
requirements document is derived from a KAOS model, it becomes possible to modify 
the KAOS model and regenerate a consistent requirements document from it.  
 
- Completeness: Requirements documents elaborated with KAOS tend to be more 
complete. A complete KAOS model leaves no space for wishful thinking (a goal not 
refined), no space for requirements for which we do not know who is responsible for, 
no space for unjustified operations, and no space for operations, for which we ignore 
who will execute what and when. Completeness of a KAOS model clearly relies also 
on the completeness of the goal model. 
 
- No ambiguity: On the one hand, the completeness criteria contribute to less ambiguity 
in requirements documents; we know who is responsible for what and who perform 
what. On the other hand, the object model contains all the information needed to 
produce the requirements document glossary. The glossary validation forces all 
stakeholders who generally have different background, to agree on the domain and 
application relevant concepts. Standards for requirements document require the 
inclusion of a glossary. With KAOS, we can build the glossary progressively and we 
get for free a criterion for deciding which concept has to be defined in the glossary: in 
fact all those defined in the object model.” 
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Chapter 4. Related Work 
 
Security remains a key challenge in the development of software systems and the goal of 
developing secure software systems has remained an area of active research. Research in 
security engineering has resulted in the realization that documenting recurring security 
problems and their solutions as security patterns is an important advancement as it allows 
software designers with little knowledge of security to build secure systems. When a 
designer  encounters  a security  problem  that  match  a  given pattern,  they  can  reuse the 
solution part  of the pattern or use the pattern to guide them in finding a solution to the 
problem at hand. In this chapter we have reviewed approaches to security analysis 
according to RBAC. Our review focused on evaluating the capabilities of these approaches 
to supporting security analysis patterns and is based on a set of evaluation criteria for 
characterizing security patterns. 
4.1. SecureUML for RBAC 
“Lodderstedt et al. [5] present a modeling language, based on UML, called SecureUML. 
SecureUML  focuses on modeling  access  control policies  and  how  these policies can  
be  integrated  into  a model-driven software development process.  It is based on an 
extended model of role-based access control (RBAC)  and  uses  RBAC  as  a  meta-model  
for  specifying and enforcing  security. RBAC  lacks  support  for expressing  access  
control conditions  that  refer  to  the  state  of  a  system,  such  as  the  state  of  a 
protected resource.  In addressing this limitation, SecureUML introduces the concept of 
authorization constraints. Authorization constraints are preconditions for granting access to 
an operation.” 
 
The SecureUML meta-model based on the RBAC model is shown in Figure 6 [5]. It 
describes the abstract syntax with UML diagrams and its information about access control. 
The meta-model shows concepts (User, Role, and Permission), UML elements 
(ModelElement), and permissions/constraints. The combination of the graphical capability 
of UML, access control properties of RBAC, and authorization constraints makes it 
possible to base access decision on dynamically changing data such as time. Similar to its 
parent modeling language UML, SecureUML focuses on the design phase of software 
development. 
User Role Permission
AuthorisationConstraint
ModelElement
ResourceSetActionType
-baseClass
ResourceType
-RoleAssignment
1..* 0..*
-PermissionAssignment
1..* 0..*
-ProtectedObject
0..* 1
-+context
1 0..*
-ActionTypeAssignment0..*
1..*
l
+constrainedElement
0..*
-Inheritance0..1
-Containment
0..*
0..1
-+contains0..*
*
 
Figure 6 SecureUML Meta-model 
(adapted from [5]) 
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4.2. UMLsec for RBAC 
“UMLsec (Jurjens,  2004) is  an  extension  of  UML  which  allows  an application  
developer  to  embed  security-related functionality into a system design and perform 
security analysis on a model of the system to verify that it satisfies particular security 
requirements. Security requirements are expressed as constraints on the behavior of  the  
system  and  the  design of the  system may be  specified either  in a UML specification or  
annotated  in source code” [2]. 
 
UMLsec is defined as a UML profile extension using stereotypes, tags and constraints. 
Role-based access control stereotype, <<rbac>>, its tagged values and constraints is a 
subset of UMLsec. <<rbac>> stereotype enforces RBAC in the business process specified 
in the activity diagram. 
 
Table 3 UMLsec Rbac Stereotype 
(adapted from [2]) 
 
Stereotypes Base class Tags Constraints Description 
Rbac subsystem protected, role, 
right 
only permitted activities 
executed  
enforces 
RBAC 
 
“The UMLsec approach consists of two main steps. The first step is translating UML 
models into UMLsec specifications. UMLsec specifications describe the behavior of a 
system in terms of its components and their interaction. The behavior of system 
components is described in terms of the messages they exchange in communication links 
between them. The next step, security analysis, involves eliciting ways by which an 
adversary may modify the contents of the data exchanged in communication link queues 
that may compromise the integrity of system behavior. The analysis focuses on a 
consideration specific types of adversaries that may attack a system in a specific way. An 
example of such an attack on a communication link between components is breach of 
confidentiality, which state  that  some  information  will  only  become  known  only  to  
legitimate  parties.  UMLsec specifications are checked for vulnerability to types of threats 
on contents of a communication link such as delete, read, and insert. The types of threats 
are adversary actions associated with particular adversary types. Delete means that an 
adversary may delete messages from a communication link queue. Read allows an 
adversary to read messages in the link queue, while insert allows the adversary to insert 
messages in the communication link” [9]. 
4.3. Summary 
Table 4 shows the general comparison of SecureUML, UMLsec and KAOS based on 
problem, context, forces, solution, and consequences criteria. These criteria are chosen 
based on the research done by A.Nhlabatsi, A.Bandara in 2009 [9].
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Table 4 General Comparison of SecureUML, UMLsec, and KAOS 
(adapted from [9]) 
 
 SecureUML UMLsec KAOS 
Problem SecureUML does not explicitly model 
security goals but focuses on modeling 
solutions to security problems. Its 
foundation of on RBAC implies that it 
is specific to security goals relating to 
controlling access to shared resources. 
Although security analysis is guided by 
specific goals and constraints in 
checking for security vulnerabilities in a 
system design, UMLsec does not have a 
specific construct for modeling security 
problems. 
The intent of a security requirements 
pattern expressed in KAOS is 
documented in the top-level goal of the 
pattern. The meta-class of the top-level 
goal will identify if the pattern pertains 
to a confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, privacy, non repudiation 
or authentication concern. The anti-
goal model that forms part of the 
pattern definition can be used to 
identify the problem addressed by the 
pattern. 
Context The modeling of context in SecureUML 
is similar to RBAC. However, the 
context only captures assets that may be 
harmed in the event of an attack. It does 
not model scenarios of attacks and 
possible harm to assets. 
Yes, the UMLsec approach explicitly 
models context of a security problem. 
However this context is limited to 
system design components, their 
interactions, and adversary models. 
As with the intent, the general context 
of the problem the pattern aims to 
address will be documented in the top-
level anti-goal. More specific details of 
the attacker knowledge, intention and 
asset properties will be captured in 
lower level goals of the pattern 
definition. The notation does not 
provide an explicit means of specifying 
harms to assets, although these can be 
captured as annotations to the anti-goal 
model. 
Forces There is no construct for capturing and 
modeling forces in SecureUML. 
Once security vulnerabilities have been 
identified the system design is 
progressively refined to eliminate the 
threat. The rationale for selecting a 
The KAOS pattern notation does not 
provide an explicit means of capturing 
the forces that might influence the 
selection of a particular refinement 
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particular solution of refining a design is 
not explicitly captured and it is not 
explicit whether alternative solutions are 
explored. It is possible though that such 
alternative security solutions can be 
explored in the refinement process based 
on the native UML design. 
pattern.  However, requirements 
engineers are able to use the 
preconditions specified in the formal 
definition of goals to determine the 
suitability of a give pattern for the 
problem at hand. 
Solution Yes. The combination of RBAC with 
UML and the authorization constraints 
extension is the bases of a security 
solution in SecureUML. 
UMLsec provides an explicit refinement 
of design in order to ensure that they 
satisfy security constraints. Once a 
design has undergone refinement its 
ability to satisfy security requirements is 
re-verified. The  refinement continue  
until  it  can  be demonstrated  that  the 
vulnerability  of  the  design  to attacks  
is eliminated 
The KAOS pattern  notation allows  
specification  of the solution  to the  
initial  problem in the form  of  sub-
goals  that satisfy  the  original  goal. 
Consequences Yes. The consequences of using 
SecureUML is a solution to an access 
control problem in access rights to 
resource are assigned to roles and users 
are assigned to roles with specific 
authorization constraints. 
When a design has been found to violate 
security requirements, UMLsec provides 
for the generation of scenarios, in the 
form of attack sequences, which explain 
how security requirements may be 
violated by the design. The results 
(consequences) of refining a system 
design in order to address security 
vulnerabilities are captured in the 
revised version of the design and 
assessed against security requirements. 
The consequence of a KAOS 
refinement pattern is to satisfy the 
original, high-level goal. If a pattern is 
specified using the formal notation 
provided by KAOS, the entailment 
relation between the sub-goals and top-
level goal can be formally proven.  
This ability to validate that the 
consequences specified for a given 
pattern are correct is particularly useful 
in the domain of security patterns. 
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In Contribution Part, we are going to present the common concepts and similarities 
between KAOS and RBAC. Later on, we will generate transformation rules between the 
security modeling approaches (KAOS-SecureUML, SecureUML-KAOS, KAOS-UMLSec, 
and UMLSec-KAOS). We will apply these transformation rules on to the models, KAOS, 
SecureUML and UMLSec separately then we will get transformed versions of these 
models.
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Chapter 5. Understand the Language 
 
In this chapter, we will try to show the common concepts and similarities between KAOS 
and RBAC. In order to do this, first of all, we will explain the common constructs between 
them and secondly make a design for transformation rules based on these common 
constructs. 
 
5.1. Common Concepts between KAOS and RBAC 
In this section, we explain the common constructs between KAOS and RBAC. We will 
show what their definitions are and how they match to each other. 
 
5.1.1. Entity - Object 
In RBAC, “Object is defined as a passive entity that contains or receives information” [11]. 
In KAOS, “Object is a thing of interest in the software being studied and its environment, 
being modeled whose instances can be distinctly identified and may evolve from state to 
state. Agents, events, entities and associations are objects” [10]. From these definitions, we 
understand that they both refer to similar concepts, changeable status or value. There is a 
slight difference about objects in RBAC and KAOS. In RBAC, objects are passive entities 
which mean they cannot perform operations. On the other hand, in KAOS, objects can be 
either passive or active which can perform operations (e.g. agents) and which cannot (e.g. 
entities and associations). So we can match objects in RBAC as in entities in KAOS. 
5.1.2. Agent - Role 
In RBAC, “Role means a job function within the organization that describes the authority 
and responsibility conferred on a user assigned to the role.” [11]. In KAOS, there is no 
construct named as role but there are agents which refers “active objects performing 
operations to achieve goals.” [10]. We understand more clearly why agent matches with 
role with the help of sub divisions of agents. “Agents can be the software being considered 
as a whole or parts of it. Agents can also come from the environment of the software being 
studied; human agents are in the environment.” [10]. This means, there are two types of 
agents: Software agents and environment agents. Both of them are active components that 
play some role towards goal satisfaction. 
5.1.3. Operation - Operation 
In RBAC, “An operation is an executable image of a program, which upon invocation 
executes some function for the user.” [1]. In KAOS, operation is expressed as “an input-
output relation over objects; operation applications define state transitions.” [14]. Both 
definitions refer to the same thing, there is an execution and these operations are 
characterized by pre and post conditions. 
5.1.4. Performance Links - Permission Assignment 
In RBAC, “permission assignment is an authorized interaction a subject can have with an 
object.” [11]. It is between roles and permissions (operations and objects) with possible 
constraints. In KAOS, there are operations and there are agents who should perform these 
operations. In order to determine which agent has permission to perform which particular 
operation, performance links are used. 
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5.1.5. User Entity - User 
In RBAC, user is defined as “any person who interacts directly with a computer system.” 
[11]. Basically, user is a human-being. In KAOS, there is no such a construct that we can 
use as user. Therefore, we have to find an alternative way to represent user in KAOS. The 
solution is to create an entity named user which leads us to create human objects of it. 
5.2. Design of Transformation Rules 
In this section, we generate a transformation process that leads us to receive transformed 
model as it is shown in Fig. 7. “Input” represents the initial model, “Action” represents the 
transformation rules applied to the input and “Output” is the outcome transformed model.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Transformation Process 
5.3. Summary 
In this chapter, we showed the similarities between KAOS and RBAC regarding their 
constructs. We first gave the definitions of these constructs and later on we explained 
which construct of KAOS match with which construct of RBAC. This is very important 
stage in our research because for the following stages, we will rely on these matches to 
prove our transformation rules. More detailed examples will be shown in transformation 
rules parts in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. In Fig. 8, we see extract of the KAOS metamodel 
showing which elements are part of RBAC. 
 
 
Figure 8 Extract of KAOS Metamodel
 
Input 
 
Output 
Action 
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Chapter 6. SecureUML - KAOS Transformations 
 
In this chapter, we describe a scenario called Meeting Scheduler Example. According to 
this scenario, we create SecureUML diagram and later on we generate transformation rules 
from SecureUML to KAOS and vice versa. 
 
SecureUML inherits features from RBAC and UML. It is based on these concepts: Role, 
Permission, ResourceSet, ModelElement, ActionType, and AuthorizationConstraints 
where ModelElement is a UML concept and the others are RBAC concepts. 
 
6.1. Meeting Scheduler Example with SecureUML 
 
The Meeting scheduler example is described as follows: “Meeting initiator needs to 
organize a top-secret meeting. He needs to invite potential Meeting participants and find a 
suitable meeting place and time. In order to ease his task Meeting initiator decides to use a 
Meeting scheduler system for sending invitations, merging availability dates and informing 
the Meeting participants. Since the Meeting is top secret, the Meeting scheduler system 
must apply appropriate security policy for the Meeting agreement (place and time). This 
means, the time and place could be entered and changed only by the Meeting initiator and 
could be viewed only by the invited Meeting participants. In other words, no unintended 
audience should get access to the Meeting agreement.” [16]. 
 
+setTimePlace()
+changeTimePlace()
+viewTimePlace()
-place : string
-time : string
<<secuml.resource>> 
MeetingAgreement
-assignedUser : string
<<secuml.role>> MeetingInitiator
-assignedUser : string
<<secuml.role>> MeetingParticipant
<<secuml.user>> Bob
<<secuml.user>> Ann
<<secuml.user>> John
<<assignment>>
<<assignment>>
<<assignment>>
-getAgreementInformation : Select
<<secuml.permission>> ParticipantPermissions
*
-participantRole
*
-participantResource
-enterAgreementDetails : Insert
-changeMeetingInfo : Update
<<secuml.permission>> InitiatorPermissions
*
-initiatorRole
*
-initiatorResource
{AC#1}
{AC#3}
{AC#2}
 
Figure 9 SecureUML Diagram for Meeting Scheduler Example 
(adapted from [7]) 
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There are three authorization constraints: AC#1, AC#2 and AC#3 to strengthen the 
permissions. 
 
AC#1  context MeetingAgreement::setTimePlace():void    
pre: self.roleInitiator.assignedUser -> 
exists(i | i.assignedUser = “Bob”) 
 
AC#2  context MeetingAgreement::changeTimePlace():void 
pre: self.roleInitiator.assignedUser -> 
exists(i|i.assignedUser = “Bob”) 
 
AC#3  context MeetingAgreement::viewTimePlace():void 
pre: self.roleParticipant-> 
exists (p1|p1.assignedUser="Ann")and 
self.roleParticipant-> 
exists (p2|p2.assignedUser="John")and 
self.roleParticipant->size = 2 
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Figure 10 Meeting Scheduler Example with KAOS 
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6.2. Transformation Rules 
 
There are two sets of transformation rules, first it is from SecureUML to KAOS and the 
other one is from KAOS to SecureUML. 
6.2.1. Model Transformation from SecureUML to KAOS 
We will use Fig. 9 SecureUML diagram for meeting scheduler example as our input. 
Below we define four transformation rules to transform a model from SecureUML to 
KAOS, these are our actions and the final figure that we have Fig. 14 SecureUML to 
KAOS Transformation Rule # 4 will be our output. 
 
SK1. A SecureUML class with the stereotype <<secuml.role>> is transformed to the 
agents.  
 Example: Roles become agents. The names of them remain the same (Meeting 
Initiator, Meeting Participant). 
 
 
Figure 11 SecureUML to KAOS Transformation Rule # 1 
 
SK2.  The SecureUML association class with the stereotype <<secuml.permission>> 
becomes performance links between agents and corresponding attributes in KAOS 
model. 
 Example: In KAOS permission assignments are handled by performance links. It 
shows which agent has permission to do which operation. E.g. Meeting Initiator is 
performing change time and place. 
 
 
Figure 12 SecureUML to KAOS Transformation Rule # 2 
 
SK3. A class with a stereotype <<secuml.resource>> is transformed to entities (Meeting 
Agreement), and the operations of this class become operations belonging to 
operation model in the KAOS model. 
 Example: the class MeetingAgreement (see Figure 9) is represented as an entity 
called Meeting Agreement in Figure 10. The operations setTimePlace(), 
changeTimePlace(), and viewTimePlace() are shown as operations respectively set 
time and place, change time and place, and view time and place in operation model 
in KAOS. 
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Figure 13 SecureUML to KAOS Transformation Rule # 3 
 
SK4.  A relationship with a stereotype <<assignment>> relationship used to connect users 
and their roles is transformed to generalization among the agents and users in 
KAOS model. 
 Example: From Figure 10 we specify “User” entity to create another object for 
users, as provided in Table 7, e.g. Agent  User  Bob. 
  
 
Figure 14 SecureUML to KAOS Transformation Rule # 4 
 
Note1: From SecureUML model, we cannot directly generate the goals that we have to 
elicit. So, we have to focus the operations and permissions to understand the aim and then 
we may write the goals with some lost information. 
 
Note2: The KAOS object model is compliant with UML class diagrams therefore KAOS 
entities correspond to UML classes in SecureUML; and KAOS associations correspond to 
UML binary association links or n-ary association classes. On the other hand in KAOS 
model there are few more association link types, such as concern, input, output etc. The 
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developer should analyze the relationship between the constructs and decide to link one to 
another. Table 5 shows the entire link types of KAOS model. 
 
Table 5 KAOS Model Link Types 
Link Type Direction 
Concerns Link one of Goal, Softgoal, Requirement, Expectation to one of 
Entity, Agent, Event, N-ary Association 
Performance Link one of Agent to one of Operation 
Operationalization Link one of Operation to one of Requirement, Expectation 
Responsibility Link one of Agent to one of Requirement, Expectation 
Assignment Link one of Agent to one of Requirement, Expectation, Goal, 
SoftGoal 
Refinement Link one of Requirement, Expectation, Goal, SoftGoal, DomProp to 
one of Requirement, Expectation, Goal, SoftGoal 
Resolution Link one of Requirement, Expectation, Goal, SoftGoal to one of 
Obstacle 
Obstruction Link one of Obstacle to one of Requirement, Expectation, Goal, 
SoftGoal 
Conflict Link one of Requirement, Expectation, Goal, SoftGoal, DomProp to 
one of Requirement, Expectation, Goal, SoftGoal, DomProp 
O_Refinement Link one of DomProp, Obstacle to one of Obstacle 
IsA Link one of Entity, Agent, Event, N-ary Association to one of Entity, 
Agent, Event, N-ary Association 
Binary Association Link one of Entity, Agent, Event to one of Entity, Agent, Event 
Link Link one of N-ary Association to one of Entity, Agent, Event, N-ary 
Association 
Monitoring Link one of Agent to one of Entity, Agent, Event, N-ary Association 
Control Link one of Agent to one of Entity, Agent, Event, N-ary Association 
Cause Link one of Event to one of Operation 
Input Link one of Entity, Agent, Event, N-ary Association to one of 
Operation 
Output Link one of Operation to one of Entity, Agent, Event, N-ary 
Association 
 
6.2.2. Model Transformation from KAOS to SecureUML 
We will use Fig. 10 meeting scheduler example with KAOS as our input. Below we define 
four transformation rules to transform a model from KAOS to SecureUML, these are our 
actions and the final figure that we have Fig. 20 KAOS to SecureUML Transformation 
Rule # 4 will be our output. 
 
KS1. In KAOS model, entities (independent, passive objects) are represented by 
stereotype <<secuml.resource>> in the SecureUML and the operations defined in 
KAOS model are transformed which hold these operations to the SecureUML class 
with a stereotype <<secuml.resource>>. 
 Example: Meeting Agreement entity becomes Meeting Agreement class. Attributes 
remain the same but additionally operations from KAOS model are also taken 
inside the class.  
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Figure 15 KAOS to SecureUML Transformation Rule # 1 
 
KS2. In KAOS model, agents (independent, active objects) can be transformed to the 
<<secuml.role>> classes in SecureUML model and each of this class should have 
default attribute as “assignedUser : string”. 
 Example: Agents become roles in SecureUML. The names of them remain the 
same. (Meeting Initiator, Meeting Participant). 
 
 
Figure 16 KAOS to SecureUML Transformation Rule # 2 
 
KS3.  In KAOS model, users are environment agents, they are derived from agent entity. 
They can be defined with a stereotype <<secuml.user>> in SecureUML model. 
 Example: Environment and software agents become users in SecureUML. E.g. Bob, 
Ann and John. 
 
 
Figure 17 KAOS to SecureUML Transformation Rule # 3 
 
KS4. In KAOS model, from performance links between agents and operations, we are 
able to identify on which operations a role can perform security actions. Thus, from 
each occurrence of this links in the KAOS model, a corresponding association class 
between a << secuml.roles>> and a << secuml.resource>> is introduced in 
SecureUML. 
 Example: Permission classes are introduced here to replace performance links 
between agents and operations. E.g InitiatorPermissions and 
ParticipantPermissions. 
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Figure 18 KAOS to SecureUML Transformation Rule # 4 
 
Note1: In KAOS model, there is no authorization constraint therefore, when we generate 
SecureUML model from KAOS model, after determining the SecureUML 
permission classes, the developer should write the authorization constraints 
according to allowed actions in these classes. 
 
Note2: In SecureUML model, there are not only operations (e.g setTimePlace) but also 
allowed actions in permission classes (e.g changeMeetingInfo: Update). It is easy to 
take operations from KAOS model but to generate these allowed actions, the 
developer should benefit from the already existing operations and also from goals. 
The developer will understand the relationship between these operations and 
actions. The authorization constraints might help to identify the relationship 
between them e.g. (enterAgreementDetails and setTimePlace), and 
(getAgreementInformation and viewTimePlace). After that these authorization 
constraints can be linked to attributes (actions) of permission classes. 
 
Note3: “The SecureUML model needs to be completed manually with the information, 
which is not captured from the KAOS model. Specifically, the developer needs to 
introduce the following information: 
 
 the attributes of the <<secuml.resource>> class that define the state of the 
secured resource(s). For example, the class MeetingAgreement should be 
complemented with attributes place:String and time:String 
 multiplicities for all the association relationships. For example, multiplicities 
for associations between MeetingInitiator and MeetingAgreement, 
MeetingParticipant and MeetingAgreement have to be defined; 
 names for the association classes. For instance, for classes with the 
<<secuml.permission>> stereotype have to be specified; 
 action types for the identified actions. For example, for action Insert meeting 
time and place action type is Insert, for Update time and place to be suitable 
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action type is Update, and for Check if time and place are suitable action type is 
Select.” [7]. 
6.3. Summary 
Table 6 shows the comparison of RBAC modeling using SecureUML and KAOS. In order 
to compare these two security modeling language, we chose the common RBAC concepts 
which SecureUML and KAOS have. 
 
Table 6 Comparison of RBAC modeling using SecureUML and KAOS 
(adapted from [7]) 
 
RBAC 
concepts 
SecureUML KAOS 
Construct Example Construct Example 
Users 
(concept) 
Class stereotype 
<<secuml.user>> 
Bob, Ann, and John Entity “User” “Bob”, “Ann”, and 
“John” 
User 
assignment 
(relationship) 
Dependancy 
stereotype 
<<assignment>> 
Dependancy 
between classes 
such as Bob and 
MeetingInitiator, 
and Ann or John 
and 
MeetingParticipant 
User object Agent >> User >> 
Name 
Meeting Initiator >> 
Bob 
Meeting Participant 
>> Ann, John 
 
Roles 
(concept) 
Class stereotype 
<<secuml.role>> 
MeetingInitiator 
and 
MeetingParticipant 
Agent MeetingInitiator and 
MeetingParticipant 
Permission 
assignment 
(relationship) 
Association class 
stereotype 
<<secuml.permissio
n>> 
InitiatorPermissions 
and 
ParticipantPermissi
ons 
Performance 
links 
Meeting Initiator 
<<performance>> 
Change time and 
place 
 
Objects 
(concept) 
Class stereotype 
<<secuml.resource
>> 
MeetingAgreement Entity Meeting Agreement 
Operations 
(concept) 
Class operations setTimePlace(), 
changeTimePlace(), 
and 
viewTimePlace() 
An operation Set time and place, 
View time and 
place, and Change 
time and place 
Permissions 
(concept) 
Authorization 
constraint 
AC#1, AC#2, and 
AC#3 
- Not defined 
explicitly 
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Chapter 7. UMLSec - KAOS Transformations 
 
In this chapter, we use a scenario called Meeting Scheduler Example that we already 
described in Chapter 6. According to this scenario, we create UMLSec diagram and later 
on we generate transformation rules from UMLSec to KAOS and vice versa. 
 
UMLsec is an extension of UML which allows an application developer to embed security 
related functionality into a system design and perform security analysis on a model of the 
system to verify that it satisfies particular security requirements. Security requirements are 
expressed as constraints on the behavior of  the  system  and  the  design of the  system 
may be  specified either  in a UML specification or  annotated  in source code. 
 
7.1. Meeting Scheduler Example with UMLSec 
We use the same meeting scheduler example as we described in Chapter 6 Section 1. 
 
UMLSec
MeetingAgreementMeetingInitiator MeetingParticipant
Insert meeting time 
and place
Set time and place
Check if time and 
place are suitable
View time and place
Change time and 
place
Update time and 
place to be suitable
Not OK
OK
 
Figure 19 UMLSec diagram for Meeting Scheduler Example 
(adapted from [7]) 
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There are three associated tags for the protected actions: AT#1, AT#2 and AT#3 to apply 
security policies. 
 
AT#1  {protected = Set time and date}  
{role = (Bob, MeetingInitiator)} 
{right = (MeetingInitiator, Set time and place)} 
 
AT#2  {protected = View time and date}  
{role = ([Ann, John], MeetingParticipant)} 
{right = (MeetingParticipant, View time and place)} 
 
AT#3  {protected = Change time and date} 
{role = (Bob, MeetingInitiator)} 
{right = (MeetingInitiator, Change time and place)} 
7.2. Transformation Rules 
 
There are two sets of transformation rules. First it is from UMLSec to KAOS and the other 
one is from KAOS to UMLSec. 
7.2.1. Model Transformation from UMLSec to KAOS 
We will use Fig. 19 UMLSec diagram for meeting scheduler example as our input. Below 
we define four transformation rules to transform a model from UMLSec to KAOS, these 
are our actions and the final figure that we have Fig. 23 UMLSec to KAOS Transformation 
Rule # 4 will be our output. 
 
UK1. In the UMLsec model the activity partitions that do not hold secured protected 
actions, can be transformed to the agents in KAOS model. 
 Example: We have agents instead of activity lanes in KAOS model. 
MeetingParticipant and MeetingInitiator. 
 
 
Figure 20 UMLSec to KAOS Transformation Rule # 1 
 
UK2. Association tags {protected} allow us identify the operations that belong to secured 
resource. We transform the activity partitions, which hold these operations to the 
performance relation between operations and the agents who has right to perform 
these operations in KAOS model. 
 Example: set time and place, change time and place, and view time and place 
operations in KAOS model. These operations should be taken from class related 
activity lanes (see MeetingAgreement). The other actions like insert meeting time 
and place is not taken place in KAOS model. 
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Figure 21 UMLSec to KAOS Transformation Rule # 2 
 
UK3. From UMLSec association tag {right} we are able to identify on which operations a 
role can perform security actions. Thus, from each occurrence of this association 
tag in the KAOS model, performance links between agents and corresponding 
operations are introduced. 
 Example: UMLSec association tag right is handled by performance links in KAOS 
model. It helps us to understand which operation can be performed by whom. 
MeetingInitiator have permission to change time and place but MeetingParticipant 
do not. 
{right=(MeetingInitiator, Set time and date)} 
{right=MeetingParticipant, View time and date)} 
{right=(MeetingInitiator, Change time and date)} 
  
 
Figure 22 UMLSec to KAOS Transformation Rule # 3 
  
UK4. Association tag {roles} allows us to identify the <<assignment>> dependency 
relationship between classes of users, in KAOS model they are defined with 
environment agents which derived from agent entity and their roles presented with 
agent. 
 Example: The actor values of associated tag {role} become environment agents. 
We are assigning environment agents who are responsible from expectations. In my 
KAOS model, I call them User. It is derived from Agent object. Bob, Ann and John 
are users. 
{role=(Bob, MeetingInitiator)} 
{role=([Ann, John], MeetingParticipant)} 
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Figure 23 UMLSec to KAOS Transformation Rule # 4 
 
Note1: From UMLSec model, we cannot directly generate the goals that we have to elicit. 
So, we have to focus the activity partitions and actions to understand the aim and 
then we may write the goals with some lost information. 
 
Note2: The entities in KAOS object model are derived from activity lanes in UMLSec 
model. The problem here is some of the activity lanes will replace as agents and 
some of them will replace as entities in KAOS model. The developer should 
understand which one is suitable to be agent and which one is suitable to be object. 
For instance, MeetingInitiator and MeetingParticipant are chosen to be agent and 
MeetingAgreeement is chosen to be entity. 
 
Note3: The attributes of entities should be filled by the developer. The nouns in the 
operations will help him to do it. For instance, set time and place action gives him 
clue that there are two terms whose values may change. These are time and place 
therefore they became attributes in Meeting Agreement entity. Also, we should link 
the operations to the entities whose attribute’s values depend on the results of these 
operations. Here we use input/output links. 
 
Note4: In KAOS model, there are association link types, such as concern, input, output etc. 
The developer should analyze the relationship between the constructs and decide to 
link one to another. The entire list of link types of KAOS model is shown in Table 
5. 
7.2.2. Model Transformation from KAOS to UMLSec 
We will use Fig. 10 meeting scheduler example with KAOS as our input. Below we define 
five transformation rules to transform a model from KAOS to UMLSec, these are our 
actions and the final figure that we have Fig. 26 KAOS to UMLSec Transformation Rule # 
3 will be our output. 
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KU1. In KAOS model, entities (independent, passive objects) are represented by an 
activity partition in the UMLsec model.  
 Example: The agents and objects become activity lanes in UMLSec model. Meeting 
Agreement entity becomes a lane in UMLSec model. 
 
 
Figure 24 KAOS to UMLSec Transformation Rule # 1 
 
KU2. In KAOS model, agents (independent, active objects) can be transformed to the 
activity partition in UMLSec model. 
 Example: Agents are also become activity lanes. MeetingInitiator and 
MeetingParticipant agents become MeetingInitiator and MeetingParticipant lanes in 
UMLSec model. 
 
 
Figure 25 KAOS to UMLSec Transformation Rule # 2 
 
KU3.  The operations defined in KAOS model are transformed to actions belonging to this 
activity partition in UMLSec. In addition, each operation becomes a value the 
UMLsec associated tag {protected}. 
 Example: The actions; set time and place, view time and place, change time and 
place in MeetingAgreement activity lane in UMLSec model. 
 {protected = Set time and date} 
{protected = View time and date} 
{protected = Change time and date} 
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Figure 26 KAOS to UMLSec Transformation Rule # 3 
 
KU4. In KAOS model, users (e.g Bob, Ann and John) are environment agents; they are 
derived from agent entity. They can be defined with actor value of the associated 
tag {role} in UMLSec model. 
 Example: Environment agents become the Actor value of the associated tag {role}. 
{role=(Bob, MeetingInitiator)} 
{role=([Ann, John], MeetingParticipant)} 
 
KU5. In KAOS model, from performance links between agents and operations, we are 
able to identify on which operations a role can perform security actions. Thus, from 
each occurrence of this links in the KAOS model, we define the role value for the 
UMLsec associated tag {right}. The value of right can be formulized in: 
{right = (roleName, actionName)}. 
 Example: 
{right=(MeetingInitiator, Set time and date)} 
{right=MeetingParticipant, View time and date)} 
{right=(MeetingInitiator, Change time and date)} 
 
Note1: “To complete the UMLsec activity diagram a developer needs to specify 
information that was not possible to capture from the KAOS diagram. For instance 
the developer needs to define initial node (e.g., to enterAgreementDetails action) 
and activity final node (e.g., from viewTimePlace action). Other control flows 
(including the conditionals ones) need also to be specified. For instance control 
flows between setTimePlace and getAgreementInformation, viewTimePlace and 
changeMeetingInfo, and changeTimePlace and getAgreementInformation might 
define a logical sequence of activity that corresponds to the one in Figure 19.” [7]. 
7.3. Summary 
Table 7 shows the comparison of RBAC modeling using UMLSec and KAOS. In order to 
compare these two security modeling language, we chose the common RBAC concepts 
which UMLSec and KAOS have. 
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Table 7 Comparison of RBAC modeling using UMLSec and KAOS 
(adapted from [7]) 
 
RBAC 
concepts 
UMLSec KAOS 
Construct Example Construct Example 
Users 
(concept) 
Actor value of 
the associated 
tag {role} 
“Bob”, “Ann”, and “John” Entity “User” “Bob”, “Ann”, and 
“John” 
User 
assignment 
(relationship) 
Associated tag 
{role} 
{role=(Bob, 
MeetingInitiator)} 
 
{role=([Ann, John], 
MeetingParticipant)} 
User object Agent >> User >> 
Name 
Meeting Initiator >> 
Bob 
Meeting Participant >> 
Ann, John 
 
Roles 
(concept) 
Role value of 
the associated 
tag {role} 
“MeetingInitiator” and 
“MeetingParticipant” 
Agent MeetingInitiator and 
MeetingParticipant 
Permission 
assignment 
(relationship) 
Associated tag 
{right} 
{right=(MeetingInitiator, Set 
time and date)} 
{right=MeetingParticipant, 
View time and date)} 
{right=(MeetingInitiator, 
Change time and date)} 
Performance 
links 
Meeting Initiator 
<<performance>> 
Change time and place 
 
Objects 
(concept) 
Activity 
partition 
MeetingAgreement Entity Meeting Agreement 
Operations 
(concept) 
An action Set time and date, View time 
and date, and Change time 
and date 
An operation Set time and place, 
View time and place, 
and Change time and 
place 
Permissions 
(concept) 
{role}, 
{protected}, 
and {right} 
Not defined explicitely - Not defined explicitly 
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PART III VALIDATION 
 
 
 
 
PART III 
 
VALIDATION  
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In Validation Part, we are going to present the type and design of the validation. We will 
discuss the threats to the validity. According to our validation test, we will validate our 
results through another scenario called Food Delivery Example. We will compare the 
transformed models with already existing models. 
59 
 
Chapter 8. Design of Validation and Test 
 
In this chapter, we present our validation type and according to this decision, our test type 
and its design. Lastly, we will show the threats to the validity. 
8.1. Validation Type 
“In order for a quality model to be valid, all its metrics (including aggregated metrics and 
indicators) have to be valid” [8]. Kitchenham et al. [3] define two major methods to check 
metrics validity. (Fig. 27):  
 
 Theoretical validation, which confirms that the measurement does not violate any 
required properties of measurement elements or of the definition models [3]. 
 Empirical validation, which corroborates that measured attributes are consistent 
with the values predicted by the models involving the attribute [3]. 
 
 
Figure 27 Theoretical and Empirical Validation 
(adapted from [3]) 
 
There are three different test types as it is shown in Fig. 27. In this work, we focus only 
empirical validation and its subdivision, correctness test due to the lack of theoretical data. 
Correctness test is more suitable than perception test and performance test according to 
check the validity of transformation rules and models because (i) for perception test, we 
needed a group of people who should use our methodology and validate the work, this 
option was not convenient to choose (lack of people who is interested in this topic, (ii) for 
performance test, our main scope is whether we can align KAOS to RBAC or not and how 
we will do that so this option did not also meet with our expectations. Therefore we apply 
correctness test to some studies of a specific case.  
8.2. Correctness Test 
In this section, we present one of empirical validation method, correctness test for KAOS 
models and transformation rules. This test is to check whether our model and rules are 
correct or not. In subsection 8.2.1, we describe its correctness test design. 
8.2.1. Design 
We define transformation rules and use these rules to transform one model to another one. 
After this transformation, we need to verify the correctness of this transformation. We are 
doing this in order to validate our work. 
 
Theoretical validation 
• Validity of the metrics 
• Validity of the scale 
• Validity of the estimation method 
Empirical validation 
• Perception test 
• Performance test 
• Correctness test 
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The research method: We plan to analyze some case studies focusing on their correctness 
on specific criteria. Our criteria depend on the transformation rules that we covered in 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. We hope to show that the correctness of the KAOS models and 
transformation rules are indeed correct and correspond to the models (SecureUML and 
UMLSec) that we created based on these transformation rules and feedback from the 
experts mainly my supervisor. 
 
Figure 28 Design of Test  
The research sample: We will provide one scenario and create KAOS model based on this 
case study. After that, we will use the transformation rules to transform this KAOS model 
to SecureUML model and UMLSec model. 
 
The Scenario: 
- Food Delivery Example 
8.2.2. Threats to Validity 
Before presenting the correctness test results, we discuss some validity threats:  
- Reliability of our KAOS model (see Fig. 29) could be seen as the internal validity 
threat. However, our generated model is theoretically valid. There might be different 
designs which can lead developer to receive different results. 
- Reliability of existing security models (see Fig. 30 and Fig. 31) could be seen as the 
external validity threat. In order to ensure the accuracy and correctness of these 
models, I used the related article [7] as a guideline to create these security models. 
8.3. Summary 
In this chapter, we try to show how to validate and test our approach. Actually we followed 
an algorithm to achieve this. Here is step by step what to do in order to validate, test and 
conclude our research. 
 
I. Read scenario or generate your own scenario. 
II. Create your security model. 
III. Apply transformation rules to this model. 
IV. Use other security models manually. 
V. Compare transformed and manually created security models. 
VI. Report the results. 
VII. Update your transformation rules. 
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Chapter 9. Food Delivery Example 
 
In this chapter, we are going to discuss another example, called food delivery. First of all, 
we describe the scenario and based on this scenario, we create three models, KAOS, 
SecureUML and UMLSec respectively. After that, we will apply transformation rules to 
the models one by one in order get another model. Finally, we will compare the 
transformed models with the existing models. 
9.1. Food Delivery Scenario 
 
The Food delivery example is described as follows: Customer wants to order food to a 
specific place. He needs to inform the restaurant at appropriate time. He contacts call 
center agent and sends his request. Call center agent receives the request and transfers it to 
the courier. The courier delivers the food to the registered address. The Food delivery 
system helps both customer and call center agent. The customer can use this system to 
enter his information (name, address, phone, etc.) and see the food information (menus, 
prices, promotions, available hours to delivery, etc.). The call center agent uses this system 
to track the orders, online support, and sending notifications. 
9.2. KAOS Model 
 
In Figure 29 we present a KAOS model to illustrate RBAC policy for the Food Delivery 
Example. Here first, we define goals and sub-goals. After that, regarding these goals we 
defined three agents Courier, CallCenterAgent, and Customer in order to associate each 
goal with an agent responsible for it. We also present entities which characterize our object 
model. The notation used in the object model complies with the one used in UML for class 
diagrams. These entities are FoodOrder and Agent. FoodOrder entity has order related 
attributes such as orderID, orderStatus, orderAddress, etc. which need to be secured. We 
use generalization in order to create two objects Software agent and Environment agent. 
We define three Environment agents Jack, Jane and Mary, who act as a user in the system. 
Lastly, we define operations Request Order, Cancel Order, Receive Order, and Deliver 
Order. These operations sum up all the behaviors that agents need to have to fulfill their 
requirements. Behaviors are expressed in terms of operations performed by agents. With 
KAOS, the operations are connected to the goals, we justify operations by the goals they 
“operationalize”. 
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Figure 29 Food Delivery Example KAOS Model
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9.3. SecureUML Model 
 
In Figure 30 we present a SecureUML model to illustrate RBAC policy for the Food 
Delivery Example. Here we define three users Jack, Jane and Mary, who play different 
roles in the system. We also present that a resource (FoodOrder), which characterize order 
attributes (orderID, orderStatus, orderTime, etc.) of the food delivery, needs to be secured. 
Thus, a certain restriction on changing the value of the attributes of this resource needs to 
be defined for the role Courier, CallCenterAgent and Customer. 
 
+requestOrder()
+receiveOrder()
+cancelOrder()
+deliverOrder()
-orderID : int
-orderStatus : string
-orderTime : string
-orderDate : string
-orderAddress : string
-orderDetails : string
<<secuml.resource>> 
FoodOrder
-assignedUser : string
<<secuml.role>> Courier
-assignedUser : string
<<secuml.role>> CallCenterAgent
-assignedUser : string
<<secuml.role>> Customer
<<secuml.user>> Jack
<<secuml.user>> Jane
<<secuml.user>> Mary
<<assignment>>
<<assignment>>
<<assignment>>
-enterOrderDetails : Insert
-cancelOrderRequest : Update
<<secuml.permission>> CustomerPermissions
*
-customerRole
*
-customerResource
-getOrderInformation : Select
<<secuml.permission>> AgentPermissions
*
-agentRole
*
-agentResource
-getOrderInformation : Select
<<secuml.permission>> CourierPermissions
*
-courierRole
*
-courierResource
{AC#4} {AC#3}
{AC#1}
{AC#2}
 
Figure 30 Food Delivery Example SecureUML Model 
 
Association class CustomerPermissions characterizes two actions allowed for the 
Customer. Action enterOrderDetails (of type Insert) defines that Customer can enter order 
attributes by executing operation requestOrder() (see class FoodOrder), and action 
cancelOrderRequest (of type Update) allows changing status of the FoodOrder by 
executing operation cancelOrder() (see class FoodOrder). To strengthen these permissions 
we define authorization constraints AC#1 and AC#2. Authorization constraint AC#1 
means that operation requestOrder() (of class FoodOrder) can be executed by one user 
Mary assigned to a role Customer. Likewise, the authorization constraint AC#2 defines 
restriction for operation cancelOrder() (of class FoodOrder): 
 
AC#1  context FoodOrder::requestOrder():void 
  pre: self.roleCustomer.assignedUser -> 
   exists(i | i.assignedUser = “Mary”) 
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AC#2  context FoodOrder::cancelOrder():void 
  pre: self.roleCustomer.assignedUser -> 
   exists(i | i.assignedUser = “Mary”) 
 
Association class AgentPermissions defines a restriction for the CallCenterAgent role. It 
defines an action getOrderInformation (of type Select) that says that only CallCenterAgent 
can receive (view) order information defined in the FoodOrder. To enforce this permission 
an authorization constraint AC#3 is defined: 
 
Authorization constraint AC#3 says that only user Jane who has an assigned role 
CallCenterAgent can execute an operation receiveOrder() (of class FoodOrder). 
 
AC#3  context FoodOrder::receiveOrder():void 
  pre: self.roleAgent.assignedUser -> 
   exists(i | i.assignedUser = “Jane”) 
 
Association class CourierPermissions defines a restriction for the Courier role. It defines 
an action getOrderInformation (of type Select) that says that only Courier can deliver 
order. In order to do this, he needs order information defined in the FoodOrder. To enforce 
this permission an authorization constraint AC#4 is defined: 
 
Authorization constraint AC#4 says that only user Jack who has an assigned role Courier 
can execute an operation deliverOrder() (of class FoodOrder). 
 
AC#4  context FoodOrder::deliverOrder():void 
  pre: self.roleCourier.assignedUser -> 
   exists(i | i.assignedUser = “Jack”) 
9.4. UMLSec Model 
Figure 31 illustrates application of UMLSec to model the Food Delivery Example. Here 
we define an activity diagram, which describes an interaction between Customer, 
FoodOrder, CallCenterAgent, and Courier. The diagram specifies that Customer can insert 
order details. Next CallCenterAgent is able to check if the order details are valid and 
suitable. If Customer wants to cancel his order, he can do it. Otherwise Courier checks the 
order details in order to finalize the delivery. 
 
This diagram carries an <<rbac>> stereotype, meaning that the security policy needs to be 
applied to the protected actions. For instance, the Customer’s action Insert order details 
leads to the action Request order for the FoodOrder. Request order is executed if and only 
if there exists an associated tag, that defines the following: (i) Request order is a protected 
action, (ii) Mary plays a role of Customer, and (iii) Customer enforces the action Request 
order. In the activity diagram this associated tag (AT#1) is defined as follows: 
 
AT#1  {protected = Request order} 
  {role = (Mary, Customer)} 
  {right = (Customer, Request order)}} 
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UMLSec
FoodOrderCustomer CallCenterAgent Courier
Insert order details
Request order
Check if order 
details are suitable
Receive order
Cancel order
Deliver order
Cancel order details Not OK
Check order details
OK
 
Figure 31 Food Delivery Example UMLSec Model 
Similarly, the sets of associated tags are defined for other three protected actions Receive 
order (AT#2), Cancel order (AT#3), and Deliver order (AT#4). 
 
AT#2  {protected = Receive order} 
  {role = (Jane, CallCenterAgent)} 
  {right = (CallCenterAgent, Receive order)}} 
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AT#3  {protected = Cancel order} 
  {role = (Mary, Customer)} 
  {right = (Customer, Cancel order)}} 
 
AT#4  {protected = Deliver order} 
  {role = (Jack, Courier)} 
  {right = (Courier, Deliver order)}} 
9.5. Applying Transformation Rules 
In this section we are going to apply transformation rules to the models that we have 
created in KAOS, SecureUML and UMLSec. We will get the following outputs according 
to our inputs: 
- KAOS  SecureUML1 
- KAOS  UMLSec1 
- SecureUML  KAOS1 
- UMLSec  KAOS2 
9.5.1. KAOS to SecureUML1 
We will use as our input Fig. 29 food delivery example KAOS model in order to get a 
SecureUML model using transformation rules that we already covered in Chapter 6. 
  
KS1.  FoodOrder entity became FoodOrder resource class in SecureUML. 
+requestOrder()
+receiveOrder()
+cancelOrder()
+deliverOrder()
-orderID : int
-orderStatus : string
-orderTime : string
-orderDate : string
-orderAddress : string
-orderDetails : string
<<secuml.resource>> 
FoodOrder
 
Figure 32 KAOS to SecureUML Transformation Step 1 
  
KS2.  Agents; Courier, Call Center Agent and Customer became roles with the same 
names in SecureUML. These roles are linked to the FoodOrder resource class with 
binary associations. 
+requestOrder()
+receiveOrder()
+cancelOrder()
+deliverOrder()
-orderID : int
-orderStatus : string
-orderTime : string
-orderDate : string
-orderAddress : string
-orderDetails : string
<<secuml.resource>> 
FoodOrder
-assignedUser : string
<<secuml.role>> Courier
-assignedUser : string
<<secuml.role>> CallCenterAgent
-assignedUser : string
<<secuml.role>> Customer
-courierRole
*
-courierResource
*-agentRole
*
-agentResource
*
-customerRole
*
-customerResource
*
 
Figure 33 KAOS to SecureUML Transformation Step 2 
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KS3. Environment agents (users); Jack, Jane and Mary became users with the same 
names in SecureUML. They are assigned to the roles with assignment links. 
+requestOrder()
+receiveOrder()
+cancelOrder()
+deliverOrder()
-orderID : int
-orderStatus : string
-orderTime : string
-orderDate : string
-orderAddress : string
-orderDetails : string
<<secuml.resource>> 
FoodOrder
-assignedUser : string
<<secuml.role>> Courier
-assignedUser : string
<<secuml.role>> CallCenterAgent
-assignedUser : string
<<secuml.role>> Customer
-courierRole
*
-courierResource
*-agentRole
*
-agentResource
*
-customerRole
*
-customerResource
*
<<secuml.user>> Jack
<<secuml.user>> Jane
<<secuml.user>> Mary
<<assignment>>
<<assignment>>
<<assignment>>
 
Figure 34 KAOS to SecureUML Transformation Step 3 
 
KS4. Performance links between agents and operations are replaced with permission 
associated classes. 
+requestOrder()
+receiveOrder()
+cancelOrder()
+deliverOrder()
-orderID : int
-orderStatus : string
-orderTime : string
-orderDate : string
-orderAddress : string
-orderDetails : string
<<secuml.resource>> 
FoodOrder
-assignedUser : string
<<secuml.role>> Courier
-assignedUser : string
<<secuml.role>> CallCenterAgent
-assignedUser : string
<<secuml.role>> Customer
<<secuml.user>> Jack
<<secuml.user>> Jane
<<secuml.user>> Mary
<<assignment>>
<<assignment>>
<<assignment>>
<<secuml.permission>> CustomerPermissions
*
-customerRole
*
-customerResource
<<secuml.permission>> AgentPermissions
*
-agentRole
*
-agentResource
<<secuml.permission>> CourierPermissions
*
-courierRole
*
-courierResource
 
Figure 35 KAOS to SecureUML Transformation Step 4 
 
Note1:  
AC#1  context FoodOrder::requestOrder():void 
 pre: self.roleCustomer.assignedUser -> 
  exists(i | i.assignedUser = “Mary”) 
 
AC#2  context FoodOrder::cancelOrder():void 
 pre: self.roleCustomer.assignedUser -> 
  exists(i | i.assignedUser = “Mary”) 
 
AC#3  context FoodOrder::receiveOrder():void 
 pre: self.roleAgent.assignedUser -> 
  exists(i | i.assignedUser = “Jane”) 
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AC#4  context FoodOrder::deliverOrder():void 
 pre: self.roleCourier.assignedUser -> 
  exists(i | i.assignedUser = “Jack”) 
 
Note2: 
We have to determine the attributes (actions) of permission classes. In order to do that, we 
should analyze the authorization constraints and define actions according to these 
operations. The names of these actions can be synonyms of the operation names or 
represent the same meaning of those operations. 
 
requestOrder()  enterOrderInformation 
cancelOrder()  cancelOrder 
receiveOrder()  takeOrder 
deliverOrder()  - 
 
Note3: 
We need to introduce the following information manually: 
- the attributes of the <<secuml.resource>> class that define the state of the secured 
resource(s).  
- multiplicities for all the association relationships.  
- names for the association classes.  
- action types for the identified actions.  
 
SecureUML1 Model: 
 
+requestOrder()
+receiveOrder()
+cancelOrder()
+deliverOrder()
-orderID : int
-orderStatus : string
-orderTime : string
-orderDate : string
-orderAddress : string
-orderDetails : string
<<secuml.resource>> 
FoodOrder
-assignedUser : string
<<secuml.role>> Courier
-assignedUser : string
<<secuml.role>> CallCenterAgent
-assignedUser : string
<<secuml.role>> Customer
<<secuml.user>> Jack
<<secuml.user>> Jane
<<secuml.user>> Mary
<<assignment>>
<<assignment>>
<<assignment>>
-enterOrderInformation : Insert
-cancelOrder : Update
<<secuml.permission>> CustomerPermissions
*
-customerRole
*
-customerResource
-takeOrder : Select
<<secuml.permission>> AgentPermissions
*
-agentRole
*
-agentResource
-takeOrder : Select
<<secuml.permission>> CourierPermissions
*
-courierRole
*
-courierResource
{AC#4} {AC#3}
{AC#1}
{AC#2}
 
Figure 36 SecureUML1 Model 
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9.5.2. KAOS to UMLSec1 
We will use as our input Fig. 29 food delivery example KAOS model in order to get a 
UMLSec model using transformation rules that we already covered in Chapter 7. 
 
KU1. FoodOrder entity became activity lane in UMLSec. 
 
Figure 37 KAOS to UMLSec Transformation Step 1 
 
KU2.  Agents; Customer, Call Center Agent and Courier became activity lanes in 
UMLSec. 
 
Figure 38 KAOS to UMLSec Transformation Step 2 
 
KU3. The operations in KAOS model became protected actions in UMLSec and they are 
placed in FoodOrder activity lane. 
{protected = Request order} 
{protected = Receive order} 
{protected = Cancel order} 
{protected = Deliver order} 
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Figure 39 KAOS to UMLSec Transformation Step 3 
 
KU4. The associated tag, {role} is assigned to actorName(s) and roleName(s). 
{role = (Mary, Customer)} 
{role = (Jane, CallCenterAgent)} 
{role = (Mary, Customer)} 
{role = (Jack, Courier)} 
 
KU5. Another associated tag, {right} is assigned to roleName(s) and actionName(s). 
{right = (Customer, Request order)}} 
{right = (CallCenterAgent, Receive order)}} 
{right = (Customer, Cancel order)}} 
{right = (Courier, Deliver order)}} 
 
Note1: 
Since UMLSec is an activity diagram, we have to specify additional information that we 
cannot capture from KAOS diagram directly. These are initial node, final node, conditional 
flows and other control flows of activity diagram. 
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UMLSec1 Model: 
 
UMLSec
FoodOrderCustomer CallCenterAgent Courier
Enter order details
Request order
Check if order 
details are OK
Receive order
Cancel order
Deliver order
Cancel order details Not OK
Check order details
OK
 
Figure 40 UMLSec1 Model 
9.5.3. SecureUML to KAOS1 
We will use as our input Fig. 30 food delivery example SecureUML model in order to get a 
KAOS model using transformation rules that we already covered in Chapter 6. 
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SK1. SecureUML role classes; Customer, Courier and Call Center Agent became agents 
in KAOS model. 
 
Figure 41 SecureUML to KAOS Transformation Step 1 
 
SK2. SecureUML permission classes became performance links between the agents 
(Customer, Courier and Call Center Agent) and the operations (Request Order, 
Cancel Order, Deliver Order and Receive Order) in KAOS model. 
 
Figure 42 SecureUML to KAOS Transformation Step 2 
 
SK3. SecureUML resource class, FoodOrder became FoodOrder entity in KAOS model. 
 
Figure 43 SecureUML to KAOS Transformation Step 3 
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SK4. SecureUML user classes; Jack, Jane and Mary became Environment agents in 
KAOS model. 
 
Figure 44 SecureUML to KAOS Transformation Step 4 
 
Note1: 
We cannot generate the goals directly from SecureUML model. Therefore, we can discover 
the goals by interviewing the users, by analyzing the scenario and reading available 
technical document. This means that goals elicitation cannot be automatically done.  
 
Note2: 
We should analyze the relationship between the constructs and decide to link one to 
another. 
 
KAOS1 Model: 
 
Figure 45 KAOS1 Model 
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9.5.4. UMLSec to KAOS2 
We will use as our input Fig. 31 food delivery example UMLSec model in order to get a 
KAOS model using transformation rules that we already covered in Chapter 7. 
 
UK1. Activity partitions; Customer, Courier and Call Center Agent became agents in 
KAOS model. 
 
Figure 46 UMLSec to KAOS Transformation Step 1 
 
UK2. Protected actions became operations in KAOS model. 
 
Figure 47 UMLSec to KAOS Transformation Step 2 
 
UK3. The role names and action names which are represented with associated tag {right} 
became performance links between agents and operations. 
 
Figure 48 UMLSec to KAOS Transformation Step 3 
 
UK4. The actor names and role names which are represented with associated tag {role} 
became Environment agents in KAOS model. 
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Figure 49 UMLSec to KAOS Transformation Step 4 
 
Note1: 
We cannot generate the goals directly from UMLSec model. Therefore, we can discover 
the goals by interviewing the users, by analyzing the scenario and reading available 
technical document. This means that goals elicitation cannot be automatically done. 
 
Note2: 
We should create entities from activity lanes in UMLSec model. The problem here is some 
of the activity lanes will replace as agents and some of them will replace as entities in 
KAOS model. The developer should understand which one is suitable to be agent and 
which one is suitable to be object. For instance, Food Order represents an entity in KAOS 
model. 
 
Figure 50 UMLSec to KAOS Transformation Note 2 
 
Note3: 
The attributes of entities should be filled by us as well. Also, we should link the operations 
to the entities whose attribute’s values depend on the results of these operations. Here we 
use input/output links. 
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Figure 51 UMLSec to KAOS Transformation Note 3 
Note4: 
We should analyze the relationship between the constructs and decide to link one to 
another. 
 
KAOS2 Model: 
 
Figure 52 KAOS2 Model 
As it is seen on KAOS1 and KAOS2 models. They are exactly same. 
9.6. Comparison of Models 
In this section, we are going to compare the models according to their correctness. We are 
going to make the following comparisons: 
 
- KAOS vs. KAOS1 
- KAOS vs. KAOS2 
- SecureUML vs. SecureUML1 
- UMLSec vs. UMLSec1 
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9.6.1. KAOS vs. KAOS1 
 
Table 8 KAOS vs. KAOS1 
 Differences 
KAOS - KAOS1 1. Goals 
- Except the other constructs we could not generate 
the goals automatically from SecureUML and 
UMLSec models.  
2.  Links 
- The links between some of the constructs are easy 
to determine but especially the links between the 
goals and the others could not been generated. 
 
Table 8 shows the differences between KAOS and KAOS1. The goals are desired system 
properties that have been expressed by some stakeholder(s). So we have to elicit the goals 
with the help of the stakeholders and especially the users of the system. Also the user 
scenarios/stories and the other technical documentation might help developer to determine 
the goals. The links related to the goals such as operationalization, concern, etc. can be 
done easily after goal elicitation just the developer should understand the relationship 
between the constructs carefully. 
9.6.2. KAOS vs. KAOS2 
 
Table 9 KAOS vs. KAOS2 
 Differences 
KAOS - KAOS2 1. Goals 
- Except the other constructs we could not generate 
the goals automatically from SecureUML and 
UMLSec models.  
2.  Links 
- The links between some of the constructs are easy 
to determine but especially the links between the 
goals and the others could not been generated. 
 
Table 9 shows the differences between KAOS and KAOS2. The goals are desired system 
properties that have been expressed by some stakeholder(s). So we have to elicit the goals 
with the help of the stakeholders and especially the users of the system. Also the user 
scenarios/stories and the other technical documentation might help developer to determine 
the goals. The links related to the goals such as operationalization, concern, etc. can be 
done easily after goal elicitation just the developer should understand the relationship 
between the constructs carefully. 
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9.6.3. SecureUML vs. SecureUML1 
 
Table 10 SecureUML vs. SecureUML1 
 Differences 
SecureUML - 
SecureUML1 
1. Actions’ names  
- Actions’ names are different. This will not cause a 
problem just they should correspond to operations 
logically. 
2. Authorization constraints 
- Linking authorization constraints to 
actions/operations is complicated. Since I am the 
only one who designs these models, according to 
my design I did it in this way.  
  
Table 10 shows the differences between SecureUML and SecureUML1. The developer 
should define comprehensible and logical names for the actions. Also the developer should 
give correct action type to these actions (Select, Update, Insert, etc.). The developer should 
be very careful about this linking authorization constraints to actions/operations. Some of 
these links can be added to permission classes and some of them can be added to resource 
classes. This is designer’s decision. 
9.6.4. UMLSec vs. UMLSec1 
 
Table 11 UMLSec vs. UMLSec1 
 Differences 
UMLSec - 
UMLSec1 
1. Naming 
- Actually the transformation was very successful 
just there are some naming differences. 
2. Conditional - Control flows 
- In comparison there was no difference but general 
usage of conditional and control flows depend on 
design. So it might show some difference in activity 
diagram from design to design. 
 
Table 11 shows the differences between SecureUML and SecureUML2. In order to 
minimize the mistakes, we have to name the activity names relevant to the scenario and 
operations. Since UMLSec is an activity diagram, we have to specify some additional 
information that we cannot capture from KAOS diagram directly. These are initial node, 
final node, conditional flows and other control flows of activity diagram. It needs to be 
written manually by the developer. 
9.7. Summary 
In this chapter, we focus on to a specific example, called food delivery scenario. Based on 
the information provided to us, we first create our own security models in KAOS, 
SecureUML and UMLSec. After that, we applied the transformation rules that we already 
covered in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 to these security models in order to get semi-
automatically transformed ones. Finally, we made comparison regarding to their 
correctness between transformed models and manually created model. 
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CONCLUSION  
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In Conclusion Part, we are going to finalize our thesis. After discussing our results, we will 
talk about some limitations and future work. 
 
After conclusion part, you can find resümee (Estonian translation of the abstract) and 
references. 
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Chapter 10. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we will conclude our work regarding the research done in this thesis. After 
showing the results, we will talk about the future work. 
 
In this research we have analyzed how KAOS can help defining security issues through the 
role-based access control mechanism. The contribution of this study gives modelers the 
criteria (which modeling approach meets the expectations and satisfies the needs of 
RBAC) whether they should select KAOS for the RBAC analysis or not. 
 
Our major conclusions include the following: 
 
- We observe that KAOS is applicable to model RBAC solutions. Table 6 and Table 7 
both illustrate that KAOS, SecureUML and UMLSec approaches have means to 
address the RBAC concepts and relationships. Besides, Figure 8 shows that some of 
the elements in KAOS metamodel such as environment agent, agent and operation, etc. 
are part of RBAC which refer to user, role and operation respectively. 
 
- According to the results, our transformation rules are not enough to get correct models, 
they are beneficial but the information system developers and designers should also 
involve in the transformation phase. These transformation rules helped us to show how 
we aligned KAOS to RBAC. Here, transformation rules are involved to make the 
alignment between KAOS and RBAC usable. 
 
This study is not without limitations. Firstly, we should say that our analysis is of limited 
scope, as it is only based on the literature work [7] and on two simple examples, Meeting 
Scheduler Example [16] and our own created Food Delivery Example. If we carried out an 
extensive study or a set of examples we could receive different results. Secondly, the 
transformation rules that we introduced do not provide automatic transformation because 
transformation rules rely on to the examples (Meeting Scheduler and Food Delivery) which 
we used. That’s why in another research with different examples, the definition of the 
transformation rules can be obtained differently. 
 
In this work we did not have a scope to define model transformation rules between KAOS-
SecureUML, KAOS-UMLSec and vice versa. However, in our contribution we include a 
set of guidelines in other words transformation rules (see Chapter 6 and Chapter 7) that 
could facilitate preparation of the RBAC activity diagrams, if one of these security 
modeling diagrams (KAOS, SecureUML or UMLSec) is already being defined. But we 
also should acknowledge that these transformation rules, currently should not be taken for 
granted because a further and more detailed analysis is required in order to define 
automatically transformation between the security modeling approaches. Such a definition 
remains for future work. Since the transformations could not be done automatically, maybe 
a tool for these languages might be implemented. 
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RESÜMEE 
 
Turvalisust peetakse infosüsteemide üheks aspektiks. RBAC on lähenemine, mis piirab 
süsteemi ligipääsu ainult autoriseeritud kasutajatele infosüsteemides. Olemasolevad 
turvalisusmudelite keeled või lähenemised adresseerivad IS-i turvalisust, kuigi 
olemasolevad keeled või lähenemised tingimata ei kohandu RBAC-i vajadustele. On 
olemas mitmeid modelleerimiskeeli (nt SecureUML, UMLSec, jne) mis esindavad RBAC-
i, kuid nad ei ole koosvõimelised (raske selgitada) ning neid ei ole lihtne võrrelda 
omavahel. Iga modelleerimiskeel esindab erinevaid perspektiive 
informatsioonisüsteemides. Pealegi on vajadus ühendada disain ja nõudestaadiumid 
selleks, et avastada süsteemi turvalisusprobleemid ja analüüsida seotud 
turvalisuskompromisse varasemates staadiumites. KAOS on eesmärgipõhine nõue 
tehnikavaatenurgast, et paika panna tarkvara nõuded. Sellel hetkel, KAOS on tulevikus 
võtmelahendus selleks, et kombineerida nõuded disainipõhimõtetega. 
  
Selles teesis me analüüsime KAOS-e võimet kohaneda RBAC-ile. Täpsemalt, me 
kasutame süstemaatilist lähenemist selleks, et aru saada kuidas KAOS-t on võimalik 
kasutada nii, et see kohanduks RBAC-ile. Meie uurimistöö põhineb 
transformatsioonireeglitel KAOS-SecureUML-i ja KAOS-UMLSec-i vahel. Pealegi, läbi 
nende muutuste näitame me kuidas sobitasime KAOS-e RBAC-ile. 
 
Selle uurimistöö esitamisel on mitmeid kasutegureid. Esiteks, see aitab potentsiaalselt 
mõista kuidas KAOS toimib koos RBAC-iga. Teiseks, see defineerib lähenemise välja 
meelitada turvanõuetele IS-i varajastes arendusfaasides RBAC-i jaoks. See rakendab meie 
tulemused juhtumuuringus selleks, et mõõta määratletud lähenemise õigsust. Kolmandaks, 
see transformatsioon KAOS-est/KAOS-eni aitaks IS arendajaid ja teistel süsteemi osanikel 
(nt süsteemianalüütikuid, süsteemi administraatoreid jne) mõista kui tähtsad need 
turvalisuslähenemised on ja millistel on rohkem eeliseid/puudusi. Me planeerime 
kehtestada oma tulemused selleks, et reegleid ja modeleid muuta olenevalt nende õigsust, 
mida mõõdetakse. Viimaseks, me oleme võimelised õigustama oma disainistaadiumit 
nõudmise staadiumiga. 
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